In the world of business, cost-revenue analyses are essential activities that help assure the health and growth of an organization. Such analyses require mathematical reasoning as well as critical reasoning skills; the latter because not all costs can be easily determined and other factors need to be weighed. In terms of military operations, costs are certainly complex. The cost of the human factor, especially, is not a precise calculation. As you read the following information, consider the multifactored and multidimensional cost factor of Operation Determination.

Enforcing the Embargo
The contribution Canada is making to the 1998 coalition against Iraq consists of HMS Toronto, two KCC-130 Hercules aircraft, and about 350 personnel. The mandate of the mission, which has been dubbed Operation Determination, is to enforce the embargo against Iraq and to escort U.S. aircraft carriers. During the 1991 Gulf War, Canada sent 2000 personnel, 24 CF-18 aircraft, two destroyers, and one supply ship. Compared with that deployment, Operation Determination is much less significant. Compared with the current U.S. presence in the Gulf —360 000 personnel, 1300 aircraft, 55 ships including six aircraft carriers, 1200 tanks, and 640 artillery pieces—Canada’s contribution is small indeed.

But any contribution has its costs. The lives of 350 Canadian families are affected as they wait for their loved ones to return home. The mission itself will cost between $4- and $8-million, depending on its duration. However, this mission is only a small part of the current deployment of the Canadian Forces in operations around the globe, many of them of a peacekeeping nature.

HMS Toronto
HMS Toronto, now operating in the Persian Gulf, is a home away from home for those who are serving on the ship. It is also a bit of Canadian territory in the middle of a major conflict zone. But perhaps most of all, it is a multitask and complex military operation in and of itself. After reading the following summary of HMS Toronto’s responsibilities prior to its assignment with Operation Determination, discuss reasons why it has been deemed necessary for Canada to have a military force. What do you feel its role should be in the international arena.

HMS Toronto is a Halifax-class frigate with a crew of 239, which includes a detachment of Air Force personnel from Shearwater, N.S., who fly and maintain a Sea King helicopter.

The 4750-tonne ship, commanded by Commander Brett Johnson, is equipped with very sophisticated weapon and sensor systems, including a rapid-fire gun, torpedoes, long-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-air missiles, navigational and firecontrol radar, and electronic warfare systems.

The ship makes extensive use of Canadian-designed computer technology for integrated machinery control, communications, and combat systems. The maximum speed of the Halifax Class is in excess of 30 knots, and its ship-handling far surpasses anything ever previously possessed by the Canadian Navy. The cruising range at 15 knots is more than 11 000 kilometres on the economical cruise engine and 7200 kilometres on the two main engines.

In February 1998 HMS Toronto assisted in the multinational effort that saw the successful rescue of 14 of the 15 crew members of a Spanish cargo ship that sank in a North Atlantic storm nearly 700 kilometres west of Gibraltar.

Prior to being dispatched to the Persian Gulf, HMS Toronto was on its second NATO deployment with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. This force normally comprises some 1300 men and women aboard frigates from Canada, the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, and Portugal. The NATO force typically sails over 90 000 kilometres a year, helping to improve procedures and tactics among NATO partners while sharpening the fleet’s own preparedness to respond immediately to any NATO requirements.

The War of Words
HMS Toronto is serving in an area of the world that has seen very serious conflict, death, and destruction. Such conflicts do not occur spontaneously; they are the result of a series of events. Not all conflict reaches this level, but violent conflict always starts with differing points of view about a particular situation. Read the following quotes about the Iraqi crisis that were spoken by various Canadian and world politicians. Summarize each point of view and discuss your findings as a class, using the following questions as a guide:

• Which point of view do you find the most sympathetic?
• Which do you find the least sympathetic?
• Which do you find the most reasoned and reasonable?
• How do these secondary conflicts of point view have a direct bearing on the military conflict?

“Everybody would like to see a diplomatic resolution, but people are saying that if military action is necessary to reaffirm the UN Security Council resolutions, then so be it.” — Art Eggleton, Canadian Minister of Defence

“Friends and allies share our conviction that [Iraqi leader] Saddam [Hussein] must not be allowed to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missiles to deliver them. I hope we can avoid the use of force. But if [Saddam] will not comply with the will of the international community we must be prepared to act, and I am very grateful that others are prepared to stand with America.” — President Bill Clinton

“The trick is to find something for the Canadian Forces to do that is politically correct and militarily relevant too.” — Martin Shadwick, a strategic analyst at York University, Toronto

“All that’s going to be achieved is further destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure and further suffering of the Iraqi people. There will be civilian casualties. . . . It is direct military involvement, and Canada becomes an aggressor, and we’ve never known Canada to be an aggressor, especially when there isn’t a UN Security Council resolution that provides a framework for this kind of action. There will be really nothing to show in the end, except that the U.S. has military muscle that it is able to use to punish whoever thumbs his nose at them. I want to be clear, no one is interested in defending Saddam Hussein here. But I think the solution to this problem is a balanced Middle East strategy.” — Raja Khouri, of the Canadian Arab Federation

“The Americans really need legitimization here of their action, knowing they are going outside the UN framework. Apparently they feel that the Canadians are very amenable to pressure and kowtowing. . . . We tend to reserve the stick for the Arabs and never the carrot. Under the gun, diplomacy is not likely to work very well.” — Atif Kubursi, President of the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations

“How could we have said no to the Americans? The question isn’t how to justify saying yes. Rather, how would you have explained a refusal?” — Alan Sullivan, President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs

“On fundamental issues of peace and security, we have never hesitated to take sides.” — Jean Chrétien

“Sorry, a predominately white, Christian coalition going into the Middle East over the objections of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt isn’t exactly the way to enhance our standing in that part of the world. And it certainly might do Saddam Hussein some good. Short term and long term, I see us making the situation worse rather than better.” — Retired Canadian major-general Lewis MacKenzie

“This big show of force is very much part of the diplomacy; it is meant to send a political message. The notion of gunboat diplomacy goes back literally thousands of years. What we’ve got here overall is something that goes beyond purely verbal support, but not much further at all. I don’t want to be too cynical about the size of the contribution or its quality, because for the 300 or 400 people over there, it’s deadly serious business. But we’re not providing the Americans with anything that they didn’t already have.” — David Rudd, of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

“It was diplomacy—wise, balanced United Nations, world diplomacy—that enabled us to reach this agreement. The good will that [Mr. Annan] brought with him—not the American or the British buildup in the Gulf and not the policy of sabre rattling. . . . [T]he crisis was with the U.S., which is trying to impose its will on the UN.” — Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Deputy Minister

“[Saddam Hussein] is very, very calm, never raises his voice. He is well-informed, contrary to the sense outside that he is ill-informed and isolated. And decisive. He told me several times, ‘I know I can do business with you; I know you are courageous and I know I can trust you.’ I trust that if we really organized in such a way that we can remove the impediments or conflicts as they come up, rather than let them build up, and then you have a storm which almost leads to war, we will be okay in the future. . . . You can do a lot with diplomacy. But with diplomacy backed up by force, you can get a lot more done.” — United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan

“One of the most telling arguments that Saddam Hussein makes is that he’s the champion of the downtrodden Arab. He’s the champion of Palestinians who have no place to go and who are sorely put upon. And that is why I think it is important that we keep our eye as well on moving that ball toward some resolution of that problem—because when we do, the ground will not be as fertile as today.” — James A. Baker, Secretary of State during the 1991 Gulf War